




Super-large Farms: The Importance of Institutions 
 
Ulrich Koester 


























Paper prepared for presentation at the 102nd EAAE SEMINAR 
SUPERLARGE FARMING COMPANIES:EMERGENCE AND POSSIBLE IMPACTS. 









Copyright 2007 by Ulrich Koester. All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this 
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears 
on all such copies. Super-large Farms: The Importance of Institutions 
Abstract 
There are many reasons for the evolution of super-farms in some of the CIS. This paper does not 
intend to elaborate on the whole set of reasons. There are already many studies which provide 
surveys on the background and the rationale of these organisations. This paper aims at focusing on 
one specific determinant of the rise of super-large farms, namely institutions. The focus is chosen as 
this determinant seems to have been overlooked, partly because it is completely beyond the 
neoclassical approach. Institutions as rules of the game can be classified into four levels according 
to Williamson. The paper mainly deals with embedded institutions. It is shown that these institutions 
are country-specific and vary widely across countries. It is argued that the evolution of super-large 
farms could only arise because cooperative and corporate farms survived up to bankruptcy and 
because embedded institutions impeded the foundation of family farms. Mental models of policy 
makers did contribute to the amalgation of corporate and cooperatives into super-large farms. 
However, it is noted that embedded institutions had such strong effects because markets did not 
work adequately and legislation and its enforcement was not supportive for the foundation of family 
farms. The paper ends with an evaluation from the economic point of view of the existence of super-
large farms and with a projection of what may happen in the future.  
Introduction 
It is obvious that the farm structure in former planned economies still differs significantly from that 
in western market oriented countries. This phenomenon can hardly be explained by neoclassical 
economics. This part of economics only focuses on the private sector and includes the following 
three main elements (Weintraub, 2007):  
1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 
2. Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits.  
3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.  
Based on these assumptions the past does not matter much. If people are maximizing utility or profit 
the farm structure in any country would only differ due to differences in product and factor prices. 
As international trade will contribute to product and factor price equalization one could expect that 
the structure of farms across countries show great similarity. Some differences might be due to 
significant differences in wage rates and disequilibrium situations due to delays in adjustment. 
However, the trend should be quite clear: Convergence of farm structures. Reality does not confirm 
theory. Obviously, this theory is not adequate to explain reality in the case under consideration.  
This paper aims at contributing to an explanation of the differences by referring to the consolidated 
findings of institutional economics. Consequently, the paper starts with identifying some institutions 
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contrast to neoclassical economics, history plays a major role in the explanation of the present state 
of the economy. Hence, the explanation of the existence of super-large farms has to take into 
consideration people’s experience in former socialist times, reasons why family farms did not 
emerge as expected and why highly indebted cooperatives and corporate farms could survive up to 
the point of time they became part of a holding. Of course, the reasons for the evolution are 
manifold and may differ from case to case. Hence, it will not be possible in this paper to deal in 
detail with each individual case. Instead, the focus will be on one specific commonality: The 
importance of first level or embedded institutions.  
Term and classifications of institutions  
The widely accepted definition of the term institution is the following: “Institutions are rules of 
human interaction that constrain possible opportunistic and erratic behaviour, thereby making 
human behaviour more predictable and thus facilitating the division of labour and wealth 
creation”(Kaspar and Streit, 1999, p. 30). According to North, institutions can be termed as ‘rules of 
the game’. It is quite obvious that the outcome of farm adjustment results from behaviour of people 
and, thus, different outcomes may be due to different institutions (rules). Neoclassical economics 
assumes that behaviour of people is guided by maximization of utility or profit and specific given 
constraints, such as income and prices for individual consumers and by factor endowment and input 
prices. Consequently people behave the same in all societies. In contrast, institutional economics 
emphasizes differences in attitudes of people leading to a huge variance in objectives and behaviour. 
Moreover, constraints for the individual’s behaviour are not only materialistic, but also - or even 
more specific - depending on the social, legal and economic environment. Unfortunately, rules 
which constrain individual behaviour differ widely across countries; institutions are country-specific 
and even person-specific. Hence, any analysis of the importance of institutions for the present state 
of an economy has to be country-specific. A discussion of the individual institutions which may 
influence the development of the farm structure and the evolution of super-large farms has to 
highlight the country-specific character of institutions.  
Institutions can be classified in alternative ways. In our presentation we follow the classification of 
Williamson (2000). First level institutions are termed ‘embedded’. They are deeply ingrained in the 
behaviour of people; these rules are accepted by individuals without any reflection on the origin of 
the rule and on the rationale of it. It is obvious that these institutions mainly derive from culture, 
tradition, and the social and economic environment. As this type of institutions has been completely 
neglected by neoclassical economics the presentation will mainly focus on this type of institutions. 
Second level institutions include the institutional environment, such as laws and property rights. 
They can be compared to the formal rules of the game. Third level institutions concern the play of 
the game, aligning governance structure with transactions. Finally, fourth-level institutions concern 
the rules for resource allocation and employment. Even if the specifics of all four types of 
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importance and lack of space - on first level institutions.  
Embedded institutions and the comparative advantage of individual types of farm 
Super-large farms could only emerge over the last decade because dissolution of the collective and 
state farms had not led to family farms as expected by western observers, but to cooperative and 
corporate farms. These farms were often somewhat smaller in area than their predecessors, but 
much larger than farms in the western part of Europe (Lerman, Csaki and Feder, 2004). Hence, the 
explanation of the super-large farms has to start with explaining why family farms did not become 
dominant following the dissolution of the state and collective farms and why cooperative and 
corporate farms could survive as long. It is argued that embedded institutions contributed 
significantly to the past development. As policy reform is not just a technical matter, but based on 
some consensus in the society, it is reasonable to investigate the embedded institutions which may 
have guided the main stakeholders in the reform process. Changes in policies are driven by the 
interests and the interactions between the main stakeholders. Hence, it is worthwhile to investigate 
the embedded institutions which may have guided the main stakeholders. These are:  
•  the general public respectively the electorate or the society at large,  
•  the rural population and workers on the farm,  
•  the managers of the cooperatives and corporations, and 
•  the policy makers. 
Embedded institutions which may have guided the society at large 
One main determinant of the present farm structure in Eastern Europe and some East Asian 
countries is the prevailing cultural belief as part of first level institutions in these countries. 
“Cultural beliefs are the ideas and thoughts common to several individuals that govern interaction – 
between these people and between them, their gods, and other groups and differ from knowledge in 
that way that they are not empirically discovered or analytically proved”. (Greif, 1994). Cultural 
beliefs make up mental models. These models contain “deeply ingrained assumptions; 
generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we 
take actions” (Senge, 1990). A mental model consists of beliefs, inferences, and goals that are first-
person, concrete, and specific. It is a mental map of how the world works.  
Mental models partly explain the behaviour of the society at large, of the could-be family farmers, 
of the policy makers and of all parties which are stakeholders in agrarian change. It is reasonable to 
assume that these mental models differ significant across countries. Fortunately, there are some 
worldwide surveys on human values available across countries. Some elements of mental models 
which are relevant for the transition of large farms to family farms are listed in Table 1 and Table 2. 
It is quite obvious that the willingness to start an own business as a private farmer depends very 
much on personal values. The surveys prove that the relevant values listed in the two tables differ 
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Russia and Hungary on the other side. It seems that the legacy of the socialist period has affected the 
propensity of people to start an own business, to undertake initiative and to accept responsibility. 
Being brought up in an environment where private property was limited and where most people 
were employed by state companies (farms) or cooperatives (collective farms) people do not 
appreciate individual entrepreneurship. The percentage of the population which think that owners 
should run their own business or should appoint the manager is much smaller than in typical 
traditional market economies.  
 
Table 1: Attitude with respect to work and business:  
Percent of agreement 
 
 Age  Income 
 16-29  30-49  50+  Lower  Middle    Upper 
  Good chances for promotion are important 
Russia    20 16 17  15  17 22 
Hungary  41 44 42  43  42 40 
West  Germany  50 44 38  37  46 46 
USA  67 58 52  56  60 58 
  It is important to use initiatives 
Russia    29 30 27  26  30 33 
Hungary  34 40 34  32  35 52 
West  Germany  66 67 48  46  61 70 
USA  47 55 51  41  52 63 
  It is important to have a job where I can achieve something 
Russia    34 28 23  23  27 33 
Hungary  64 60 54  52  59 69 
West  Germany  65 63 59  55  62 68 
USA  71 71 72  68  71 77 
  It is important to have a responsibility on the job 
Russia    15 22 23  19  21 23 
Hungary  41 53 53  48  52 52 
West  Germany  52 56 52  45  54 63 
USA  54 57 56  50  58 62 
  The owners should run their own business or should appoint 
the managers 
Russia    16 12 08  10  12 14 
Hungary  19 27 24  20  24 39 
West  Germany  39 45 55  45  46 50 
USA  52 51 65  55  57 58 
  I like to assume responsibility 
Russia    20 24 28  21  28 28 
Hungary  38 60 50  47  53 67 
West  Germany  53 59 53  47  54 65 
USA  56 67 57  60  59 69 
Source: Inglehart, R. M. Basanez and A. Moreno, 1998. 
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exchange of products and services on markets in a market economy. Trust in partners of exchange is 
an important determinant of the intensity of exchange. If people do not trust each other they will 
limit transactions and they will prefer barter transactions. Trust is of special importance on 
agricultural markets. Food is generally not a search good where one knows the quality of the 
product. Most farm product are either experience goods, of which you learn the quality only with 
consuming the product and or credence goods, where the consumer neither knows the quality of the 
product nor the production process, so has to trust quality. In addition to trust in the quality of the 
product, trust in the behaviour of the partner of exchange is an important determinant of the 
intensity of transactions. Take the following example: The would-be farmers may need machinery 
to start farming, but may not have the financial means to pay cash. The potential seller may not be 
willing to sell on credit as he does not trust in the buyer’s capability and willingness to pay the 
agreed instalments. Hence, the would-be farmer may not be able to start farming due to lack of trust 
in his behaviour by the potential partner of exchange.  





Table 2: Attitude with respect to trust and legal system. 
Percent of agreement 
 
 Age  Income 
  16-29 30-49 50+  Lower  Middle    Upper 
  I trust my family completely 
Russia   50  55  58  53  54  58 
Hungary 97  96  96  95  97  98 
West Germany  95  96  94  92  96  96 
USA 98  98  99  97  99  99 
  Trust people of my own nationality  
Russia   41  43  49  42  47  45 
Hungary 49  49  57  53  51  59 
West Germany  56  63  74  66  67  65 
USA 72  74  78  75  74  77 
  Do you trust the legal system 
Russia   35  33  47  38  38  36 
Hungary 65  53  64  60  59  59 
West Germany  62  63  70  64  65  67 
USA 56  61  57  60  56  60 
  Confidence in the state (The state should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for) 
Russia   32  31  34  35  30  2749 
Hungary 49  49  51  58  46  41 
West Germany  26  21  21  27  23  18 
USA 18  13  11  15  14  12 
Source: Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno, 1998.  
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in Russia is significantly less than in the western countries and than in Hungary. In contrast, trust in 
the State is higher in Russia than in the US. 
It should be noted that these differences do not necessarily express cultural differences, but also the 
personal experience of people. If Russian and Hungarian people had no experience with potential 
transaction partners they have not been able to build up trust.  
Data in Table 1 and 2 are derived from a survey across the total population in the countries. The 
values for the rural population may differ; however, most likely not in supporting the emergence of 
family farmers.  
Embedded institutions which may have guided rural population and could-be family farmers 
Table 3 conveys the main reasons why employees of farm entities did not want to start farming. 
First level institutions play an important role. More than half of farm employees in Russia and even 
72 percent in Ukraine were not willing to change their life style. Obviously, their attitude to work 
and self-expression is very different of those who are eager to start their own business in a market 
economy.  Of importance is also the embedded institution with respect to ownership of land and to 
transfer of land. The negative attitude towards private land ownership in Russia is clearly expressed 
in interviews. For example, about 90 percent of respondents in a survey conducted in Russia 
(Serova, 2000) disagreed with the concept of land reform and seemed to be against private land 
ownership. Interviews in Novosibirsk and Shitomir revealed that only 33 percent of the farmers 
were willing to mortgage their land (Schulze et al., 1999). Owners seem to be afraid of losing their 
land because land may be considered as an important asset in risk hedging. Given the constraints on 
the land market due to the mental models of landowners and the rural population, it is difficult for 
the sector to adjust to the rapid changing environment during the transition period. If, in addition, 
the initial land allocation is inefficient, this situation can be exacerbated. A survey conducted in 
Novosibirsk province revealed that 78.6 percent of respondents working in agriculture disapproved 
selling and buying of farm land (Tillack and Schulze, 2000). This may partly explain why land is 
even idled in some of these countries, in spite of rural unemployment. Anyhow this attitude with 
respect to ownership of land affects transfer of land negatively. Hence, the starting point in the 
farming structure matters. 
Noteworthy is also the willingness to accept risk. It is well known that some societies are more risk 
averse than others. People in the former planned economies seem to be very risk averse as compared 
to the population in other countries. A farmer has always to bear risk. The result of his economic 
activities shows up only after he has invested in the production process some time before. It is 
reasonable to assume that the willingness to bear risk is also dependent on education and personal 
experience during childhood and work. However, education in the planned economies was not apt to 
educate entrepreneurs and workers were not trained to undertake risky activities. Hence, the number 
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was limited not only because of the attitude towards risk, but also because of  
•  the magnitude of the risk,  
•  the possibilities to cope with risk of the risk and  
•  the survival alternatives. 
 
Table 3. Reasons Not to become a private farmer  
(percent of rural households surveyed) 
 
 Russia  Ukraine  Moldovia 
Insufficient capital  75  71  52 
Difficulties with inputs  59  84  48 
Afraid of risk  56  84  48 
No wish to change lifestyle  56  72  33 
No legal guaranties  40  65  20 
Source: Lerman, Z.,C. Csaki and G. Feder, 2004. P. 159. 
 
   
Due to the past structure in rural areas employees on agricultural entities had the alternative to 
continue working on the former collective or state farm and generating an income by farming the 
household farm more intensively. Access to the social net of the large farms and the potential to 
improve living by extending the household farm may have withheld some could-be family farmers 
from starting their own family farm. Thus, it is not surprising that most first-generation private 
farmers in Russia were not former farm workers, as was established in a  survey , which revealed 
that 75 percent of early private farmers  were ex-urbanites, and only 5-7 percent were former 
members of state and collective farms. “Romantics of the rural way of life” and demobilized 
military personnel accounted for 20 percent of private farmers (Wegren and Durgin, 1997). Thus, 
outsiders were first generation of new farmers in Russia. It is difficult to assess which had the most 
impact on this outcome: embedded institutions or rational economic behaviour, especially when the 
less risky alternative of working on the household plots under the umbrella of the large farm cannot 
be ignored. Anyway, the preferences of employees on agricultural entities are highlighted in Table 
4. Only 2 percent of the employees considered starting as a private farmer in Russia in 1995 and 
only one percent considered selling their plot of land. 
The risk for setting up a family farm was higher than in western market economies because of badly 
functioning markets, in particular land and credit markets, the unstable macroeconomic environment 
and lack of experience as a private farmer. The possibility to cope with risk was lower than in 
western style market economies because of low income and privately owned assets as well as 
because of badly functioning credit and insurance markets.  
  8Table 4: Preferences of Employees of Agricultural Entities 
with respect to use of land  (In percent) Russia 1995 
Intention  Average of surveyed ag. 
entities 
Variations across ag 
entities 
Leave in collective use  78 59-94 
Sell 1 0-3 
Lease 4 0-13 
Increase the size of private residence  4 0-9 
Start a private farm  2 0-3 
Uncertainty 11 2-27 
Source: Bogdanovsky, 2000 
 
   
Moreover, some of these societies seem to express an unwillingness to take credit. Of course, to take 
credit implies to bear risk as the ability to repay is determined by unknown factors in the future. 
Hence, risk aversion may explain the low propensity for taking credit. In addition, some societies 
are reluctant to fall into debt. It is considered as something which ‘one should not do’ as ‘it 
expresses living beyond one’s means. This cultural belief can be quite important for restructuring 
the farm sector in transition countries. It is known from countries, which have undergone a 
significant restructuring of the agricultural sector by implementing a new agricultural structure with 
a new generation of farmers that many of the new farmers had to give up farming after few years. 
These persons were either not able to be a good farmer as they lacked the necessary skills and did 
run into debt or they preferred an alternative job. However, moving from a planned to a market 
economy will most likely be accompanied with exit and expansion of farms. Hence, the willingness 
to run into debt is one prerequisite for setting up a family farm. 
Summing up, family farms did not evolve as expected in most of the CIS because of embedded 
institutions affected the behaviour of could-be and would-be family farmers.  
Embedded institutions guiding the managers of large farms 
Managers of large farms were educated in a planned economy where the focus was on large 
agricultural enterprises. Hence, it should have been no surprise that they strongly believed in the 
comparative advantage of large farms. Hence, they were not supportive for setting up small family 
farms. According to their belief would-be private family farmers would not serve the interest of the 
society in the best possible way.  
  9“Under the former socialist system, farms were expected to produce in accordance with central 
plans and production target. Considerations of cost minimization or profit maximization were of 
secondary importance compared with the goal of maximizing production to meet the plan.  … The 
traditional production orientation dies hard (Lerman, et al., 2004) or embedded institutions survive 
long. No surprise, that surveys evidenced that managers still placed some priority, however with 
decreasing extent, to maximizing production. Moreover, these managers had never been trained to 
collect all the information needed for maximization of profit and to use the calculus of marginal 
analysis in maximizing profit.  
Based on their training and experience in a socialist society many of these managers still felt 
committed to support the so-called social sphere on the country-side which was very helpful in 
stabilizing welfare of the rural population, but it conflicted with the goal to set up a market oriented 
competitive agriculture farm structure. Thus, it could be expected that these stakeholders in policy 
reform were reluctant to support a genuine policy reform aiming at restructuring the agricultural 
sector. Moreover, it could hardly be expected that they were to implement a policy which conflicted 
with their mental models and their personal interests.  
Embedded institutions play also a significant role for the management of large-scale farms in the 
form of juridical entities. Some societies strongly emphasize kinship. It goes without saying that 
people in charge for hiring, monitoring, granting licenses etc. favour their relatives. This fact has 
implications for managing a farm which relies on many wage earners. It is expected that labour 
contracts are monitored and enforced by the managers in a functioning market economy. Hence, the 
manager is supposed to assess the individual performance. If the manger is not the owner there is a 
principal agent problem. The manager is the agent of the owner, which could be a juridical person, 
and at the same time the principal of the worker. If the employed manager does not fulfil his 
obligation in monitoring and enforcing the labour contract he breaches his contract with his 
manager. It could be considered as corruption. He receives a benefit in exchange for granting a 
favour to specific employees, but the burden has to be carried by his principal. 
Embedded institutions guiding policy makers acting in favour of the survival of cooperative 
and corporations in agriculture  
Embedded institutions guided the behaviour of the policy makers to a large extent. The main 
elements of the mental models seem to be: 
1.  Perceptions on the superiority of large-scale farms as compared to medium size family farms. 
Structural adjustment of agriculture in many of the transition countries is limited by policies, which 
aim to preserve the past structure, i.e. large-scale agriculture in the form of cooperative or 
corporations or in any other organisational form. This situation, which exists in most of CISs, results 
from the perception of policy makers and other important stakeholders that large farms are superior 
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countries, which have given rise to collective ownership in the privatisation process.  
2.  Perception on the role of the state, in particular with respect to income provision. Interviews of 
the farming population in the CIS often reveal that people blame their bad economic situation 
mainly on the failure of the government and not on themselves (Serova, 2000). Hence, policy 
makers feel that they are obliged not to negatively affect the well-being of any individuals. This 
understanding has important implications for the selection policy reform measures.  
3.  Perception on food security. Policy makers in transition countries tend to believe that domestic 
production is needed to secure food on the aggregate level, and that low food prices are the first best 
policy to secure food for poor households. Shrinking of production below the level of 100 percent 
self-sufficiency of a specific agricultural product was often considered as a failure of policies. 
Needless to say that these perceptions have had a strong impact on the design of agricultural policy 
during transition.  
4.  Attitude with respect to changes. During transition, policies must change but also people’s 
attitude must change. Socialist societies with job security and limited labour mobility did not require 
significant changes of the population in a short period of time. The same holds true for policy 
makers and other stakeholders.  
Table 5 summarizes the embedded institutions which have guided the main stakeholders in 
transition countries. It is obvious that it could not be expected to achieve a fast change in the 
farming structure.  
Why did institutions support the survival and decline of corporate and cooperative 
farms? 
It has been highly visible for a long time that many of the cooperatives and corporate farms were 
loss making and had been near insolvency for some time. The survival has been possible due to first 
level and second level institutions on the side of the owners of the capital, the farm managers and 
the policy makers.  
The owners of the land were not willing to take out their land as they did not want to start a family 
farm (see above) and because it was difficult due to administrative matters to take out the land. The 
administrative difficulties were partly due to the management of the farms, but also due to the 
bureaucracy in the rayons and due to the mental models and other constraints of policy makers who 
did not design adequate laws for a change.  
Policy makers even supported the large farms if they had become nearly insolvent; they were afraid 
that the dissolution would have had negative impacts on food security and social conditions in rural 
areas. The production of public goods of the large farms weakened the profitability of these farms, 
but did create sympathy by policy makers to support them. Soft budget constraints contributed to the 
survival and the linkage between household farms and the large entities enhanced the erosion of the 
production potential of the large farms (Koester and v. Cramon-Taubadel, 1997; Amelina, 2000). 
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suppressed the emergence of family farms and the dissolution of large farms.  
Why did institutions contribute to the evolution of super-large farms? 
The emergence of super-large farms was highly path-dependent. It became evident even for 
conservative policy makers that many of the cooperatives and corporations could not economically 
survive under the given market environment. One alternative would have been to force them to 
bankruptcy. However, policy makers did not favour this alternative. First, they widely believed in 
superiority of large farms and, hence, preferred to avoid dissolution. Bankruptcy had most likely led 
to a split up of the entities. Second, policy makers still believed in their obligation to secure food 
security on the regional level by provision of stable food supply from regional production. 
Bankruptcy of the large farms would have led to uncertainty in food production. Bankruptcy might 
have destabilized regional production. Third, bankruptcy would have impaired the social sphere in 
rural areas.  
Policy makers were likely right to assume that stabilization of food production was much more 
certain than opting for the alternative ‘dissolution of large farms by bankruptcy’. It was known that 
revival of agriculture needed a significant inflow of capital. However, rural credit markets did not 
function well and, hence, new farmers cultivating land of segmented large farms could hardly 
expect to start farming with an adequate capital endowment. Thus, the establishment of super-large 
farms as part of holdings was considered as an adequate mean to revitalize agriculture.  
Of course, there was also an interest of the integrating agro-industries, the banks or large companies 
which were not directly related to agricultural input or output markets. Some of them were just 
looking for profitable investment and found that investment in agricultural was expected to be 
profitable. Some of them wanted to secure the credits which they had provided to the cooperatives 
and corporations in the past and some of them wanted to secure supply of raw material for their 
processing company. However, it should be recognized that the integrating companies may have not 
realized their plans if policy makers and could-be family farmers had not been guided by strong 
embedded institutions. These embedded institutions determined very much the positive environment 
for the integrating companies. Moreover, these institutions also affected policy makers in facilitating 
the integration. There are even cases where policy makers directly interfered in favour of the 
integrating company (See for example Wandel, 2007). 
Table 5 presents an overview in form of a summary of the mental models of the main stakeholders 
in agrarian reform in Russia.  
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Table 5: Mental models and main stakeholders in Russian agricultural policy reform 
Elements of mental 
models  
Policy makers on 
different regional 
levels 
Academics   Bureaucrats   Agribusiness 
managers  
Farm managers  Land owners  Public at large 
Perception on the role 
of the state, in 
particular with respect 
to income provision 







State as helping 
hand and grabbing 
hand  
State as conserver 
of the status quo 
State as conserver 
of the status quo 
Inactive  State as helping 
hand 
Attitude with respect to 
provision of 
information 
Negative Negative           Negative Negative Negative Negative












Inactive      State
responsibility 
Land ownership, 




  Negative Negative  Negative  Negative Positive;  reluctant  Negative 
Perceptions about the 
superiority of large-
scale farms as 
compared to medium 















Attitude with respect to 
risk 
Risk averse  Risk averse  Risk averse  Heterogeneous  Heterogeneous     Widely risk averse 
Attitude with respect to 
changes  
Heterogeneous      Negative Negative Changes  over  time  Changes over time  Reluctant   Reluctant 
Source: Author’s compilation from Bodganovsky, 2000; Serova, 2000. Assessment of the economic impact of super-large farms  
The evolution of the super-large farms has a specific sectoral as well as an overall economic impact. 
The sectoral impact seems to be positive as efficiency of this part of the agricultural sector has 
improved. The increased inflow of capital and technology has led to higher yields and higher labor 
productivity. However, it should be noted that the main positive effect of the super-large farms in 
comparison to the other part of the agricultural sector mainly derives from badly functioning credit 
and land markets.  
The assessment from an economic point of view (macroeconomic view) looks very different. There 
are some positive and some negative effects. Better access to capital has likely improved the 
allocation of capital across sectors in the economy and has contributed to a higher GDP. The inflow 
of human capital and changes in management may have led in the same direction. However, on the 
negative side the increase in rural unemployment and the worsening of social conditions for the 
rural population have to be booked.  
Further dissolution of collective farms and the new creation of large-scale private farms will have 
some serious implications on the social sector, on rural employment, and on the political market. 
Lerman and Csaki (1999) reported that most collective enterprises provided merit and public goods 
to the rural community - although in a declining amount over time - and only few had transferred 
their social assets as required by law. It is questionable whether the new farms will contribute to the 
well-being of the rural population to the same extent as the collective farms did. Of course, this does 
not mean that restructuring is not needed. However, it would have been accompanied by less social 
hardship if the law on transferring the social assets had been observed and if the communities had 
got a chance to gain access to financial resources allowing them to provide social services. The 
formal institutions concerning social assets were not set in place efficiently and, thus, the creation of 
new organisations (players in the game) gives rise to concern.  
The new farms will increase capital intensity, will change the production pattern to more capital 
intensive products and will lay off workers. Rural unemployment will likely increase significantly. 
Hence, workers will get additional incentives to leave rural areas and skilled workers may take up 
this challenge. This may even happen if they are employed because availability of public and merit 
goods will decline.  
The new emerging structure will also have an impact on the political market in the rayons and the 
oblasts.  
Inherent dangers of the new structure are: 
•  Political influence 
•  Effect on production pattern •  High capital intensity 
•  Neglect of the social sector 
•  Increase in rural unemployment 
Prospects 
The prospects for the super-large farms depend very much on the economic and social environment 
and political decisions. It is difficult to make a projection of these determinants. I suggest 
approaching the problem in two ways: First, I assume that changes in the farm structure will be 
driven by pure market forces and that markets function well in the near future. Second, I assume a 
more realistic approach, namely that the change in the structure is driven by policies and markets do 
not work well. 
Scenario market driven structural change 
Market forces would eventually lead to an optimal farm size and a legal form (corporate, cooperate, 
partnership or single owner) which is the most competitive.  
First I discuss the question of an optimal farm size. There is nothing like the optimal farm size. 
Those agricultural economists who “believe” in the comparative advantage of family farms 
emphasize the high transaction costs on the farm for monitoring workers (farm internal transaction 
costs) (Allen and Lueck, 1998); furthermore, they tend to neglect economies of scale and farm 
external transaction costs which arise in buying inputs and selling outputs. Costs for supervising 
farm workers for a given farm size (measured in revenue or area cultivated) have declined over the 
last two decades and will continue to decline. The main cause of the decline was the reduction in 
labor force per unit of production. Large farms which used 12 to 14 workers per 100 ha in East 
Germany employ less than one worker or 0.5 workers per 100 ha in these days. Thus, the work force 
for a 2000 ha farm dropped from 240 to 20 workers. Moreover, nowadays it is easier to monitor 
workers due to the use of computers and internet.  A farm manager who may be in charge for some 
agricultural enterprises can check the daily performance of the workers at the end of the day even 
without having been to the establishment. The use of google earth will allow controlling workers 
even on the field from far away locations. Therefore, I assume that internal transaction costs are less 
important nowadays as in the past and they will become less important in the future. In contrast, 
economies of scale seem to have increased over the last decade and will likely decline further. 
Moreover, economies of scale are related to the know-how of the management and to the ability of 
the management to collect information on new technologies. It can be assumed that some of the new 
technologies are dependent on the scale of the farm; larger farms have a comparative advantage in 
using the total set of technologies.  
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labour contracts as well as external transaction costs favour farm sizes which are significant larger 
than the present family farm in Europe or US.  
Moreover, the future basis for family farms seems to be weak in CIS. The constitutive elements of 
family farms are: 1) The farmer owns most of the capital (including land); 2) the farmers’ family 
supplies a high share of the labor force and 3) the farmer makes the main decisions on the farm. It is 
unlikely that the first condition can be met in a foreseeable future. As ownership transfer of land is 
limited in any country changes in farm sizes are accompanied by a higher share of rental area.  
Whether the present large holdings will be competitive depends very much on management. There 
are cases which support the survival of large entities in some countries, such as Hungary. The 
modern communication technology helps to manage these large farms. However, apart from the 
farm size the legal form matters. Monitoring the management and workers by the owners of the 
capital is more difficult for corporations than for single-owner enterprises or for partnerships. 
Moreover, it is more difficult to control the management in a very diverse enterprise where the 
agricultural holdings play a minor role for the entity. It is unlikely that the management of the 
holding and the owners of the capital have the information and expertise to monitor the management 
of the sub-units adequately. Hence, I would expect that large holdings could possibly survive if the 
main activity is related to agriculture and agriculture related activities.  
Scenary: Policy driven structural changes  
It is most likely that markets will not work adequately for many years to come. Moreover, political 
interference may be the driving force of changes in the agricultural structure. It can be assumed that 
the present agro-holdings will have political cloud to change legislation and political interference in 
their favour. These agglomerates will further impede the evolution of private farms. The tendency to 
introduce capital intensive methods will continue, in particular because labor markets do not 
function well and wage rates are likely too high for securing full employment. The countryside will 
likely only provide opportunity to work for a declining number of people in agriculture. The drop in 
agricultural employment will negatively affect the prospect for rural areas. This development will be 
less negative for the population if employment opportunities in the cities improve significantly. 
However, such a development will likely not happen as labor markets, credit markets and housing 
markets will continue to work inadequately. Hence, the danger for increasing rural poverty is likely 
even if the agricultural sector may become technically more efficient and produces more than in the 
past. It should be noted that there is likely a significant difference between sectoral and overall 
efficiency. The first is granted if the sector produces cost efficient at prevailing market prices. 
Overall efficiency will be lower if market prices are distorted and the overall economy does not use 
all factors of production efficiently. If there is unemployment the shadow price of labor is near zero, 
however, the enterprises may be faced with highly positive wage rates. Hence, enterprises may 
prefer to employ more capital and less labor and, thus, improving their profit but deteriorating the 
  16employment situation in the country. The society would be better off if more labor would be 
employed with the same volume of capital. 
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